Joe Biden’s Summit for Democracy is just days away. It will take place virtually on December 9-10, 2021. The U.S. administration invited most democracies in the world but has also sent invitations to countries with questionable democratic records. Biden entered the White House with an extremely ambitious agenda of defending democracy at home and abroad. After the January 6^th insurrection at the U.S. Capitol, it would have been unthinkable to do otherwise, with the very survival of the centuries-old American democracy in peril. However, several questions need answers: what are the concrete objectives of the Summit, beyond the diplomatic pleasantries and heroic speeches? What are the expected ‘deliverables’? Can it have a lasting impact? Support for democracy is a key idea of Joe Biden’s presidency and foreign policy doctrine. With some reason: During the past fifteen straight years we’ve witnessed an increasing erosion of democracy across the world and growing contestation of the liberal script coming from illiberal and authoritarian regimes across the world. Last year, the Freedom House called this year’s report on the state of global freedom “Democracy Under Siege.”

Rallying democracies around the world around a common project therefore seems like a laudable endeavour. The entire Biden plan for democracy at home and overseas holds substantial promise but much will depend on what the Biden administration and democratic governments from across the world take home from the summit. Unfortunately, the entire ‘democracy’ agenda of Joe Biden is – for the moment, at least – promising yet vague and conceptually imprecise.

As it stands today, the entire ‘Summit for Democracy’ project risks becoming victim to several pitfalls that may erode and limit the promise it holds for democracy worldwide. Many questions remain unanswered, and the success or failure of Biden’s democracy endeavour will depend on providing pertinent and useful answers.

Questionable Choice of Invitees

Even before the start of the Summit, several voices have questioned the choice made by the U.S. State Department and the White House to invite certain U.S. allies that are led by governments with questionable democratic records. Among the 108 countries invited to the summit, one can find countries such as Poland, where the Law and Justice government ruling the country has taken a plethora of political and institutional actors to erode democracy, the rule of law, and liberal values. It has captured judicial institutions and dismissed concerns over fairness and democratic values. In Brazil, another invited country, Jair Bolsonaro has promoted large-scale militarization of the government, undermined the democratic legitimacy of the country’s legislature, and engaged in what accounts as the strongest attack against the Supreme Court. In the Philippines, also on the list of guests, President Rodrigo Duterte has actively undermined human rights in the country. Prosecutors of the International Criminal Court have already announced a full investigation against him, accusing him of unlawfully killing possibly tens of thousands of people.

Two opposing arguments have emerged over the choice of guests made by the U.S. government. The first one claims that by inviting countries with questionable democratic records, the Biden administration can aim to limit the damage made and stimulate a U-turn of those governments. While an admirable objective, it seems rather fanciful and overtly idealistic. The second argument emphasizes that by inviting governments that undermine democracy at home, the Biden administration may enable and legitimize those governments and their anti-democratic actions. Just imagine what someone like Andrej Duda, the Polish President, or Rodrigo Duterte, the President of the Philippines, will do after the end of the Summit? It does not sound unconceivable that they will go on prime-time TV to say that the U.S. president and the rest of the world recognized that what they are doing is democratic, validating their anti-democratic policies.

Protecting or Promoting Democracy in the World?

Another conceptual issue is related to the ultimate aim of the Summit for Democracy and of the political project underpinning it. Is it about protecting democracy where it already exists or is it more expansive, seeking to promote democracies in places where it has either eroded or never existed? It is important to note that the summit is “for” democracy and not “of democracies.” The difference, while minor, is conceptually important. If it is a summit for democracy, then its aims and membership can be larger than if it is a summit “of” democracies.

Much has been written about the ultimate aim of the summit but just recently the State Department published that the key aim of the summit is “defending [democracy] against authoritarianism.” But what does “defending” mean in this context? Is promotion of democracies and human rights abroad part of the defensive strategy? This is important because the U.S. diplomatic rhetoric has often justified military interventions overseas by claiming a “defence” of democracy at home. The War on Terror that exhausted the hegemonic power of the United States over the past two decades has been based, partially, on a defence of democracy at home and promotion of it abroad. The Biden administration must make sure that it will not re-create the conditions to be forced to re-engage militarily in the same way it has been doing over the past two decades.

Protecting From Domestic or Foreign Threats and Malign Influences?

A final question regards the threats that Biden’s political project seeks to protect democracies from. The sources of threats that democracies across the world are encountering are domestic and internationally. Domestically, democracies are threatened by populism and illiberal political forces that seek to undermine open society and political pluralism. They are also undermined by increasing inequality and lack of equitable access to public services and economic opportunities. Internationally, democracies are under attack from illiberal and authoritarian powers that challenge the liberal international order and its liberal script. Countries such as China or Russia have developed a repertoire of initiatives and tools to influence, undermine, and provide alternatives to democracy and pluralistic societies. From Infowars to the provision of investment funding that empower autocrats, China and Russia are actively seeking to erode democracy worldwide.

To this question, the Biden administration seems to have answered in two ways. The U.S. and its allies should provide protection against international sources of threat against democracies, while democratic leaders should engage in concerted strategies to challenge domestic sources. In a way, we can talk about a division of labour. The U.S. may commit itself to challenge international threats to democracy, particularly China and Russia, while national leaders may commit to challenge individual and context-specific causes of domestic anti-democratic backlash. Will it work?

Maybe! But if it will, it will happen only in those countries where political leaders are still strongly committed to democratic values. And it will happen as long as such leaders remain in power. In countries such as Poland or Brazil, domestic societal actors, especially civil society, will play key roles.

A Long Road Ahead

Biden’s Summit for Democracy is just the first step on a long road, with no certainty that things will get better the end of the ride. The coming Summit for Democracy and the political project underpinning it shows a lot of promise and ambition, but many problems remain. It is obviously just the beginning of a larger initiative from the Biden administration, yet this is no excuse for the vagueness and conceptual imprecision showcased in the presentation of the Summit. It is still unclear what are the expected deliverables, the outputs, and outcomes to be expected from the Summit.

Marius Ghincea is a visiting doctoral researcher from the European University Institute. During his stay at SCRIPTS, he works on his doctoral thesis on identity contestation and foreign policy consensus, with Germany as one of his key case studies.