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Perspectives on the Russian contestation of the Ukrainian state - No. 2: Freedom is not for free

by Tanja A. Börzel

№ 39/2022 from Feb 28, 2022

Russia’s war in Ukraine is neither a rollback against the liberal intrusiveness of the European order, nor necessarily a revisionist project to re-establish the Russian empire, argues Tanja A. Börzel. Rather, this war emanates from internal challenges to regime survival by democratic forces, and it could mean the end of a sovereign and democratic state of Ukraine. It is now time for Europeans to realise what is at stake – and to act accordingly.

Russia's war deals fatal blow to Europe’s post-Cold War security architecture

Russia's war deals fatal blow to Europe’s post-Cold War security architecture
Image Credit: Jilbert Ebrahimi on Unsplash

Russia’s war might be the end of Ukraine as a sovereign state. It certainly deals a fatal blow to Europe’s post-Cold War security architecture. For years, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been contesting its liberal intrusiveness and has sought a return to a more Westphalian order based on equal sovereignty of states, their territorial integrity, and non-interference in domestic affairs. Somewhat ironically then, Putin’s war against Ukraine violates precisely those principles. The prohibition of violence, rule-based multilateralism, and collective self-determination are central planks of the liberal international order, which have been supported even by non-liberal states, most notably China, which shares Russia’s rejection of liberal universalism regarding human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.[1]

President Putin, however, does not merely seek to roll back the liberal intrusiveness of the European order which builds collective security around the respect for human rights, democracy, and rule of law. And his revisionism does not necessarily aim at re-establishing the Russian empire either, despite some nostalgic references in his speeches. Rather, his demands to turn back the clock to the time before NATO’s eastward expansion aim at installing a new version of the “Brezhnev Doctrine”, which claimed that a threat to any socialist state was a threat to all and had guided the foreign policy of the Soviet Union since the 1960s. Putin’s updated version reads as follows: a threat to non-liberal rule in any state in Russia’s “near abroad” constitutes a threat to Russia, and therefore justifies its intervention. Just as in Soviet times, such threats are not about external security, but emanate from internal challenges to regime survival by democratic forces. This is exactly what is at stake in Ukraine and what motivated Russia’s invasion in Georgia in 2008, the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, and now motivates the full-fledged attack against Ukraine we are currently witnessing.

Putin legitimizes Russia’s intervention in Ukraine as a means to stop NATO’s eastward expansion, which he considers a threat to Russian security interests. Really? NATO is, after all, a defense alliance. Central and Eastern European countries seek to join it to protect themselves against an ever more aggressive Russia. Moreover, Ukraine membership in NATO is not in the cards anytime soon. Nor has NATO taken any military measures that could justify such drastic countervailing measures. What renders Ukraine a security threat to Putin’s regime is its progressing democratization. While the road to democracy has been bumpy, Ukraine is firmly committed to the liberal script. The Euromaidan protests of 2013 were sparked by then President Viktor Yanukovych’s last-minute withdrawal from the Association Agreement with the European Union after Russia had threatened sanctions. Ukrainians turned to the streets to denounce wide-spread government corruption and human rights violations. The “Revolution of Dignity” removed Yanukovych from office who then fled to Russia. Shortly after, Russia invaded and subsequently annexed the Crimean Peninsula. Russian forces have also supported pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas region. The recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states predated Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Ukraine has responded to Putin’s attempt to destabilize the country by seeking closer relations with the United States and its European allies. An amendment added to the Constitution of Ukraine in 2019 enshrined in the preamble the country’s quest for membership in the EU and NATO. Joining the EU and NATO is contingent upon the commitment to and adoption of the liberal script. This liberal conditionality is the real threat to Putin. Ukraine has opted against his model of illiberal democracy. The 2019-2020 protests in Georgia and the 2020-2021 protests in Belarus taught Putin how contagious the liberal script can be. The brave fight of Ukrainians in defending their freedom might teach him another lesson. Europe is witnessing a wave of protest and solidarity, which could spill over into Belarus and Russia.

Putin’s demands to revoke Ukraine’s NATO membership perspective and to untighten the country’s military, political, and economic relationships with Europe and the United States violate Ukraine’s right to collective self-determination not only regarding which allies to choose but, more fundamentally, which script to follow.

The current war is about the survival of Ukraine as a sovereign and democratic state. It is also about the script according to which Europeans will organize themselves in the future. Accepting the Putin Doctrine would effectively end Europe’s post-Cold War order. It would most likely also end the prospects of Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, and other former Soviet republics for democratization. For many Europeans, this might seem a reasonable price to pay amidst the “massive collateral damage”[2] that defending the liberal international order may cause. It would not be the first time that the European Union and its member states prioritized stability over democracy. Yet, does Russia have the power to quell any anti-government protest against corruption, abuse of power, and human rights violations in what it considers its sphere of influence? Even if it did, what about the collateral damage of such aggression and repression? Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians are fleeing their country seeking shelter and protection in the European Union.

Nobody expects Europeans to fight, let alone die, for the freedom of Ukraine. Energy shortages might be a small price to pay given what is currently at stake. The German government announced Sunday to spend 100 Billion Euro on the modernization of the German army – as an “investments in our freedom”.[3] German politicians seem to have finally understood that freedom is not for free.


[1] While China has not condemned Russia’s invasion, it abstained in the vote on the UN Security Council resolution demanding the immediate stop of Russia’s aggression and withdrawal of its troops from Ukraine.

[2] German Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock, justifying why Germany opposes Russia’s exclusion from the banking communications system SWIFT; https://www.nordbayern.de/politik/massive-kollateralschaden-baerbock-gegen-swift-ausschluss-1.11872085; accessed February 27, 2022.

[3] German Minister of Finance, Christian Lindner, in the German Bundestag, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/video237181519/Lindner-sieht-in-den-100-Milliarden-Euro-Investitionen-in-unsere-Freiheit.html; accessed February 27, 2022.


Last edits for this blog entry were on 27 February 2022, 11:22 p.m. CET

Prof. Dr. Tanja A. Börzel is Director of the Cluster of Excellence “Contestations of the Liberal Script” (SCRIPTS), Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for European Integration at Freie Universität Berlin.