Boris Nitzsche: Professor Libman, you have been researching Russia, China, and authoritarianism for many years. What led you to focus so intensively on propaganda?

Alexander Libman: Propaganda is a central instrument of authoritarian rule—and this has become very clear in political science over the past ten years. In the past, research focused primarily on repression; today we understand much better that information manipulation is at least as important for autocracies. These systems have learned to use communication spaces very efficiently. What interests us is understanding how such regimes stabilize their power through narratives—and how they generate legitimacy among their own populations. The interaction between Russia and China after 2022 is particularly fascinating: both countries promote alternative visions of the world order, yet very few people ask how these concepts are actually “sold” to their citizens.

Nitzsche: Propaganda has existed as long as power itself. What distinguishes contemporary authoritarian propaganda from the classic, let’s say Orwellian, form?

Libman: Of course there are continuities, but the practice has become more complex. The totalitarian idea that a state can control all information is empirically outdated. Today, many authoritarian regimes operate in relatively open information environments, where they coexist with alternative interpretations—and often quite successfully. Moreover, it is not always about persuading people. Often, the goal is simply to create the impression that everyone supports the regime. This generates conformity without the need to control every individual.

Nitzsche: In your research, you describe two contrasting narratives: Russia’s “fortress” narrative and China’s “bridge” narrative. What do these mean?

Libman: Both states see themselves as counterweights to a Western-dominated world order. But Russia primarily justifies its alliance with China in negative terms: standing together against the West. That alone is sufficient as a source of legitimacy. China, by contrast, emphasizes positive goals—cooperation, economic benefits, cultural exchange. While Russia imagines itself as a defensive fortress, China presents itself as a bridge. This also reflects their different foreign policy strategies: confrontation on the one hand, integration on the other.

This difference shows how differently authoritarian systems engage with the public. In Russia, a narrative of threat dominates, fostering cohesion by creating enemies. In China, by contrast, there is a stronger emphasis on optimism about the future—the idea that China’s model is globally attractive. This positive self-narrative is a central component of Chinese soft power.

Nitzsche: But why do autocracies need legitimacy at all? They can enforce their policies anyway.

Libman: They do not need to win elections, but they do need consent—or at least cooperation. Repression alone is costly and inefficient. A regime that is perceived as legitimate receives voluntary compliance: people go along because they believe decisions make sense. Elites are also sensitive to this. If they get the impression that the population no longer supports the leader, that can become dangerous. Legitimacy therefore also serves as an internal signal that everything is “under control.”

Nitzsche: Are these narratives simply accepted domestically, or are they contested?

Libman: They are always contested—just to varying degrees of visibility. Authoritarian systems are very good at suppressing or drowning out alternative interpretations. But people always interpret propaganda through their own beliefs. This leads to selective reception: they are more likely to believe what fits their expectations. We refer to this as “cherry-picking.”

Nitzsche: So propaganda is not simply believed, but filtered?

Libman: Exactly. People evaluate information based on their prior experiences. If a message clashes with their core beliefs, it is ignored. That is why consistency in storytelling is so important for regimes. The more stable a narrative is over many years, the more it shapes public expectations—and the more effective propaganda becomes.

This long-term consistency is crucial: propaganda is not just a short-term instrument, but part of a collective memory. The longer a narrative remains present, the more deeply it shapes people’s thinking. This is also true in democracies, by the way—except that counter-narratives are more visible there.

Nitzsche: You also speak of “soft propaganda,” meaning emotional and cultural content. What role does it play?

Libman: A very significant one. Emotions are often more powerful than facts. Foreign policy is abstract for many people, but emotions—pride, fear, a sense of belonging—are universal. Music, culture, entertainment, or symbols can evoke emotions that support political narratives without explicitly explaining politics. This is especially effective when messages connect to existing cultural patterns—national myths, historical traumas, or the feeling of belonging to a “great civilization.”

Nitzsche: Can we draw lessons from Russia and China for other authoritarian systems?

Libman: To a certain extent. Both are resource-rich states with strong foreign policy ambitions—that is not the case everywhere. But in general, other autocracies also need to legitimize their international cooperation domestically. The idea that autocrats automatically reinforce one another is too simplistic. Every alliance has to be justified—and that does not always succeed. The two cases also show that propaganda is not a one-way street: it is interpreted, appropriated, and sometimes even subverted ironically. This ambivalence is what interests me most.

Nitzsche: You work with so-called “text-as-data” methods. What can this kind of computational analysis achieve—and where are its limits?

Libman: It allows us to systematically analyze large amounts of text, such as thousands of media articles, to identify themes and tones. That would be impossible to do manually. But it does not replace close reading. Algorithms capture structures, not meanings. Ideally, one combines both—machine-based analysis and qualitative interpretation. It becomes particularly exciting when looking at time series, that is, how narratives change over years. Quantitative methods can really reveal new dynamics there.

Nitzsche: What are you currently working on?

Libman: We are just finishing a third paper that empirically examines the effectiveness of authoritarian propaganda—whether and how it actually changes attitudes. Methodologically, this is very challenging, especially in closed systems like China or Russia. But that is precisely what makes it exciting. In the long run, I am interested in how propaganda evolves over time—what kinds of ruptures and learning processes occur in these systems.

Nitzsche: Professor Libman, thank you very much for the conversation.