



Jürgen Gerhards, Lukas Antoine, and Rasmus Ollroge

**The Liberal Script on Military Humanitarian Intervention  
and How Citizens around the World Support It.  
Results from a Comparative Survey in 24 Countries**

SCRIPTS Working Paper No. 22



CLUSTER OF EXCELLENCE

Contestations of the Liberal Script

## CLUSTER OF EXCELLENCE “CONTESTATIONS OF THE LIBERAL SCRIPT (SCRIPTS)”

SCRIPTS analyzes the contemporary controversies about liberal order from a historical, global, and comparative perspective. It connects academic expertise in the social sciences and area studies, collaborates with research institutions in all world regions, and maintains cooperative ties with major political, cultural, and social institutions. Operating since 2019 and funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG), the SCRIPTS Cluster of Excellence unites eight major Berlin-based research institutions: Freie Universität Berlin, the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, the Berlin Social Science Center (WZB), as well as the Hertie School, the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), the Berlin branch of the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), the Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOIS), and the Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO).

## SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER SERIES

The SCRIPTS Working Paper Series serves to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas, enrich the discussion and generate further feedback. All SCRIPTS Working Papers are available on the SCRIPTS website at [www.scripts-berlin.eu](http://www.scripts-berlin.eu) and can be ordered in print via email to [office@scripts-berlin.eu](mailto:office@scripts-berlin.eu).

Series-Editing and Production: Dr. Anke Draude, Inga Sell, and Carol Switzer

Please cite this issue as: Gerhards, Jürgen / Antoine, Lukas / Ollroge, Rasmus 2022: The Liberal Script on Military Humanitarian Intervention and How Citizens around the World Support It. Results from a Comparative Survey in 24 Countries, SCRIPTS Working Paper No. 22, Berlin: Cluster of Excellence 2055 “Contestations of the Liberal Script (SCRIPTS)”.

Cluster of Excellence  
“Contestations of the Liberal Script (SCRIPTS)”  
Freie Universität Berlin  
Edwin-Redslob-Straße 29  
14195 Berlin  
Germany

+49 30 838 58502  
[office@scripts-berlin.eu](mailto:office@scripts-berlin.eu)

[www.scripts-berlin.eu](http://www.scripts-berlin.eu)  
Twitter: [@scriptsberlin](https://twitter.com/scriptsberlin)



## CONTENTS

Authors

Abstract

1	Introduction	3
2	The Liberal Script and International Law on Military Intervention	5
3	Factors That Can Influence Citizen Attitudes toward Military Humanitarian Intervention	9
3.1	Embedded in and Committed to the Liberal Script	9
3.2	Modernisation and Postmaterialist Values	10
3.3	Control Variables	11
4	Data and Methods	11
5	Results	13
5.1	Country Differences in Support for Humanitarian Military Intervention	14
5.2	Individual-level Explanatory Factors	15
5.3	Country-level Explanatory Factors	16
5.4	The Neutralisation Effect	18
6	Conclusion	21

References

Supplementary data

## AUTHORS



**Jürgen Gerhards** is a Professor Emeritus of Sociology at Freie Universität Berlin and a Senior Professor in the Research Unit “Borders” at SCRIPTS. He is a member of the Nationale Akademie der Wissenschaften Leopoldina and the Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften. His research interests include comparative cultural sociology, European studies, and the sociology of the public sphere.

[j.gerhards@fu-berlin.de](mailto:j.gerhards@fu-berlin.de)



**Lukas Antoine** is a doctoral researcher in the Research Group “Comparative Survey” at SCRIPTS. He holds an MA in Political Science from Freie Universität Berlin, a BA in Political Science from Universität Bremen, and was awarded with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) study scholarship from 2014-2019. His research interests include attitude and survey research as well as surveillance, privacy, and security studies.

[lukas.antoine@fu-berlin.de](mailto:lukas.antoine@fu-berlin.de)



**Rasmus Ollroge** is a doctoral researcher in the Research Group “Comparative Survey” SCRIPTS. He holds an MA in Sociology from Freie Universität Berlin and a BA in Political Science from Georg-August-Universität Göttingen. His research interests include the globalisation divide, cleavage theory, and survey research.

[r.ollroge@fu-berlin.de](mailto:r.ollroge@fu-berlin.de)

# The Liberal Script on Military Humanitarian Intervention and How Citizens around the World Support It

## Results from a Comparative Survey in 24 Countries

Jürgen Gerhards, Lukas Antoine, and Rasmus Ollroge

### ABSTRACT

The liberal script, as enshrined in international law, strongly supports the sovereignty of nation-states but allows for military intervention by the international community when human rights are violated in a country. In this article, we explore whether citizens support this idea and explain differences in citizen attitudes toward military intervention. We derive our hypotheses from the neo-institutionalist notion of the existence of a liberal world script and the modernisation theory of value change. Our analysis is based on PALS survey data from 24 countries. The results show that a majority of respondents support the notion that military intervention in another country is legitimate when human rights are violated. Differences in citizen attitudes toward military intervention can be better explained with reference to neo-institutionalist theory than with the hypotheses derived from modernisation theory.

### 1 INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

Russia's war against Ukraine began on 24 February 2022, when President Vladimir Putin ordered an invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops. The war is condemned by most countries in the world and is considered a massive violation of international law. On 2 March 2022, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted the resolution No ES 11/1 "Aggression against

Ukraine" (United Nations 2022), with 141 countries voting in favour, five against, and 35 countries abstaining. The resolution deplores in the strongest terms the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine and demands Russia end the war and withdraw all troops immediately. Russia's war is seen as a violation of Article 2 of the Charter of the UN, which guarantees the territorial integrity and political independence of any state.

State sovereignty and the prohibition of intervention in their internal affairs are among the sacred elements of the international order. These are not only codified in international law but also belong to what the Stanford School of Neo-institutionalism has called the script of world society (Meyer 2010; Meyer et al. 1997; Meyer/Jepperson 2000). A script consists of normative ideas and institutional prescriptions regarding the organisation of societies and the world polity (Börzel/Zürn 2020), including normative assumptions about the sovereignty of states. However, the idea of sovereignty of states and their territorial integrity constitutes only one feature of a world society script. The second central element is individual rights, to which every person is entitled based on the fact that they are human (Meyer 2010; Meyer et al. 1997; Meyer/Jepperson 2000). These rights are universal no matter where one lives; they are codified above all in the Declaration of Human Rights. The two ideas – sovereignty of nation-states on the

<sup>1</sup> The article was written in the context of the Cluster of Excellence "Contestations of the Liberal Script (SCRIPTS)" (EXC 2055, Project-ID: 390715649), which is funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany's Excellence Strategy – EXC 2055. We are very grateful to Heiko Giebler, Michael Zürn, and Tanja Börzel who commented on a first version of the paper.

one hand and universal rights of individuals on the other – can stand in tension with each other; for example, if a state massively violates human rights within its territory, protecting human rights takes priority over state self-determination – at least from a liberal perspective. International law takes a similar view, as it permits intervention in another state if human rights are being massively violated.<sup>2</sup>

We have taken the current example of Russia's war against Ukraine only as a hook to pursue a more general question. We are interested in the perspective and attitudes of citizens and their perceptions of a legitimised war. More precisely formulated, we ask: *To what extent do citizens in different countries of the world support the idea, enshrined in international law, that the international community may invade another country militarily when human rights are violated? And which factors can help to explain differences in citizen attitudes?* We will answer these questions with the help of data from the *Public Attitudes Towards the Liberal Script (PALS)* survey, carried out in 24 countries covering different regions of the world.

In the first section, we will discuss in more detail the core elements of the world polity script as understood by the Stanford School and the distinct features of a liberal script, as it is partially enshrined in international law. The protection of the sovereignty of states and, thus, the prohibition of intervention is a paramount requirement of international law. Hence, a war of aggression is, in principle, prohibited. An important exception is when human rights are massively violated in a

country. In this case, the international community is, under certain circumstances, allowed to intervene militarily in another country. The liberal script, as enshrined in international law, builds the normative framework of our study. The article focuses on the extent to which citizens support the notion that the international community should intervene militarily when human rights are violated. In the second section, we describe the factors that can explain citizen attitudes toward military humanitarian intervention. We derive our hypotheses from two broader theories: sociological neo-intuitionism and its notion of the existence of a world script on the one hand and the modernisation theory of value change on the other. The hypotheses derived from the two broader theories relate to macro factors at the country level and micro factors at the individual level. We hypothesise that the more a country is embedded in the liberal world and the more individuals support the liberal script, the higher the likelihood that citizens advocate military humanitarian intervention. In terms of modernisation theory, we hypothesise that the more modernised a country is, the more educated an individual is, and the more they have internalised postmaterialist values, the higher the likelihood that citizens support the idea that a military intervention to protect human rights is a legitimate policy.

While section three provides an overview of our data set, the indicators used to measure the hypotheses, and the methods applied, section four presents the results of the descriptive and multivariate analyses. Findings show that a majority of respondents (56%) support the notion that military intervention in another country is legitimate when human rights are massively violated. At the same time, significant differences between countries exist. With 27%, Russia has by far the lowest approval rate, whereas more than two-thirds of respondents in Spain, India, and France support the idea that the international community

2 The term humanitarian intervention can have different meanings as Vaughan Lowe and Antonios Tzanakopoulos (2014) have shown. We follow the narrower definition of Lowe and Tzanakopoulos (2014) and understand humanitarian intervention to mean “the use of force to protect people in another State from gross and systematic human rights violations committed against them, or more generally to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, when the target State is unwilling or unable to act”.

is legitimised to invade another country militarily when human rights are violated.

The multilevel analysis concludes that both at the macro level of countries and at the micro level of individuals, neo-institutionalism has a higher explanatory power compared to modernisation theory. It turns out that people who have a high commitment to the liberal script and – although to a lesser extent – people who live in countries with a high level of embeddedness into the liberal script tend to favour humanitarian military intervention more. In contrast, the level of modernisation of a country and individuals' postmaterialist values and their level of education does not impact attitudes towards humanitarian military intervention. However, and we discuss these in a separate paragraph, it may be that the result with respect to modernisation theory has to do with the fact that the wording of the question in the survey led to the neutralisation of two different attitudes.

Our study is not the first to examine citizen attitudes toward war and the specific case of humanitarian intervention. What does it contribute to the state of research? Some studies have analysed people's attitudes towards (1) military intervention and the use of military force in foreign policy (Boussios/Cole 2012; Clements 2013; Coticchia 2015; Crowson 2009; Fetchenhauer/Bierhoff 2004), (2) war and peace (Bizumic et al. 2013; Blumberg et al. 2017; Cavarra et al. 2021; Dupuis/Cohn 2011) and (3) human rights (Crowson 2004; Swami et al. 2012). These studies have several shortcomings. First, no study links citizen attitudes toward military intervention to the issue of human rights protection. Second, existing surveys tend to focus on attitudes towards specific real-world military interventions, such as the military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, from the specific cases, one can only draw limited conclusions about citizens' general

attitudes.<sup>3</sup> Third, some studies rely on student samples, which does not allow one to draw conclusions about the attitudes of the entire population. Fourth, most studies focus on one or two countries<sup>4</sup> from the Global North, so nothing is learned about the attitudes of citizens in other regions of the world.

This paper goes beyond the existing state of the literature in several ways. First, we use data from the international comparative PALS survey of 24 countries with representative country samples, which allows us to (a) expand the research focus beyond the countries of the Global North, (b) generalise the results to the whole population of each country, and (c) analyse explanatory factors not only at the individual but also at the country level. Second, our study is very much theory-driven in two respects. We derive our research question from an interpretation of international law and the liberal script, thus linking citizen attitudes to the normative self-understanding of societies. In addition, we systematically derive the hypotheses from two grand social science theories; we neither introduce possible explanatory factors in an ad hoc and eclectic manner nor are we interested in psychological concepts such as big five personality traits or authoritarianism.

## 2 THE LIBERAL SCRIPT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ON MILITARY INTERVENTION

Societies have always developed ideas about how a society should look and which social orders can be regarded as legitimate and illegitimate. Following the Stanford School of neo-institutionalism (also referred to as world society theory), these ideas of a desired society can be called a script

<sup>3</sup> A notable exception is the study by Detlef Fetchenhauer and Hans-Werner Bierhoff (2004).

<sup>4</sup> An exception is the four-country study by Jens Ringmose and Berit Kaja Børgesen (2011).



of a society. A script is an idea of how a society *should be* organised and not a description of how a society is organised. Part of the script is the definition of legitimate actorhood. From the perspective of neo-institutionalism, actorhood is not naturally given but the result of a historical process of cultural construction (Meyer 2010; Meyer et al. 1997; Meyer/Jepperson 2000). The script of modern societies consists, among other things, of two actors who are granted legitimate actorhood: states and individuals. Both actors are endowed with special rights that may be in tension with each other. Elsewhere we have described this tension in more detail; we have also explained in more detail under what conditions it is legitimate to intervene militarily in another state (Drewski/Gerhards 2020).

The notion that states are the central units of world polity is illustrated by Meyer et al. with the following fictitious example. If a hitherto unknown but inhabited island were discovered today, most people and institutions in the world would have a clear idea of how this island society should be organised in the future:

A government would soon form, looking something like a modern state with many of the usual ministries and agencies. Official recognition by other states and admission to the United Nations would ensue. The society would be analyzed as an economy, with standard types of data, organizations, and policies for domestic and international transactions. Its people would be formally reorganized as citizens with many familiar rights (Meyer et al. 1997: 145).

Organizing the world polity as an ensemble of sovereign states is not just a mere idea or a script; it is an idea that has become a reality. From a historical point of view, the organisation of societies as nation-states is a relatively recent development (Hobsbawm 1992; Maier 2016). Historians interpret the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the Peace of Westphalia (1648) as the beginning of the

emergence of a world order consisting of an ensemble of sovereign states. The European states agreed to mutually recognise each other as sovereign entities that rule over a territory and the people living inside the borders of that territory. They agreed to respect each other's national borders and not intervene in the internal affairs of other states. Even if the script for organising societies as nation-states and the world polity as a network of sovereign states originated in Europe, it has spread worldwide and became institutionalised by international law, especially after World War II (WWII).

A script of a society in general and the actorhood of states in particular can be institutionalised in various ways. International law is a special form of institutionalisation because it is endowed with high legitimacy. International law has been drafted and signed by nation-state governments and hence is legitimised by those units of the world that constitute the societies of the world. Most states have agreed to join international organisations such as the UN and to sign binding international treaties such as the Charter of the UN, which is the founding document of the UN. All nations agreed that the world order should be based on the principle of the sovereign equality of states. This idea includes the strict prohibition of forcible intervention in another state. In particular, Article 2(4) of the Charter of the UN states that:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations (United Nations 1945).

Only when a country is attacked by another state does it have the right to wage war against the aggressor to defend itself.



This strict prohibition of a war of aggression is a consequence of two devastating world wars. Even though the notion of national sovereignty and the equality of states can be traced back to the Peace of Westphalia, forcible intervention by powerful states frequently occurred in international relations. With the establishment of the UN after WWII, the world attempted to rebuild an international order premised on peaceful relations between states. In particular, it sought to shield smaller nations from the aggression of more powerful states, as had occurred with the German invasion of Poland in 1939. The principle of non-intervention was further invigorated in the context of decolonisation and the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement. These countries feared interference in their domestic affairs by the world's superpowers. They frequently continue to insist on the principle of non-intervention as a cornerstone of international relations. In a landmark decision on the United States (US) intervention against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice further spelled out the principle of non-intervention. It prohibited any coercion against a state's internal and external affairs, i.e. the freedom to choose its own "political, economic, and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy" (International Court of Justice 1986: para 205). This prohibition covers direct military action in another territory or providing support to subversive groups and terrorists.

The script of how societies and the world polity should be organised, however, grants a special role not only to states but also to individuals (Elliott 2007; Meyer et al. 1997; Soysal 1994). It imagines the individual as an autonomous actor endowed with the volitional capacity to decide on their own life, destiny and a wide range of individual rights. This interpretation means that no one else is legitimised to determine an individual's destiny – unless that individual authorises someone else. The individual is not the property of any collectivity, state, or other association.

Furthermore, the script assumes that every individual has the right to individual self-determination by virtue of their nature as human beings. In this respect, all humans are equal; no arbitrary differentiation can be made between them on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, etc.

Similar to how territorial integrity and sovereignty of nation-states are protected by international law, the rights of individuals are protected by a variety of treaties. Central in this regard is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948. For the first time in human history, this declaration defined the rights and freedoms to which every human being is equally and inalienably entitled. Article 1 of the declaration reads accordingly: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." Every person is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration (United Nations 1948).

With regard to the question under which conditions it is legitimate to intervene militarily in another country, the two principles – sovereignty and integrity of nation-states on the one hand and human rights of individuals on the other – are contradictory. The principle of national sovereignty and the state's monopoly of force over its territory strictly prohibits forcible interventions across national borders. However, the prohibition of forcible intervention equally protects autocratic regimes that repress their citizens' individual rights, which contradicts the principle of universal human rights. Depending on the theoretical point of view, either the rights of individuals or the sovereignty of the state is given a higher priority.

At this point, we will briefly introduce the distinction between a script, as described by the Stanford School and summarised in the last paragraph and the liberal script, as a specific variety of a script (Drewski/Gerhards 2020; Zürn/Gerschewski 2021). While the neo-institutionalist approach does not comment on whether the sovereignty

of a state or universal individual rights should be given preference, the liberal script is decisive in this respect. The normative core of liberalism is the principle of individual self-determination (frequently referred to as individual autonomy, freedom, or liberty). From a liberal perspective, the right to collective self-determination derives from the right to individual self-determination, as the latter also includes the freedom to associate with others and constitute a community. It follows that collective forms of self-determination are only legitimate if they rest on the free and equal consent of the members of a community. This also applies to states. From a liberal perspective, authoritarian states that suppress their citizens cannot legitimately claim collective self-determination. This argument provides legitimation for the international community to intervene in another country that massively violates its citizens' individual rights.

International law takes a similar view, at least to some extent. There is no doubt that the protection of the sovereignty of states and, thus, the prohibition of intervention is the paramount requirement of international law. However, there are considerations in international law that legitimise military intervention to protect human rights, such as the so-called "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) doctrine (Gray 2018: 58–64), a commitment endorsed by all member states of the UN at the 2005 World Summit. R2P is a reaction against the international community's failure to respond to the Rwanda genocide in 1994 and the Srebrenica genocide in 1995. The R2P doctrine consists of three pillars (Gray 2018: 58–64): First, states have the duty to protect their populations from humanitarian disasters. Second, they assist each other in their protection responsibilities. Finally, if they fail to fulfil their duty to protect their populations, the international community is entitled to act, if necessary, by force. The grounds for intervention cover ethnic cleansing, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. The Security

Council resolution to impose a no-fly zone in Libya in 2011 was the first case where the UN authorised a military intervention citing the R2P. The R2P, and especially the applicability of the third pillar, is a controversial and contested issue, as some states interpret military intervention as an infringement upon a nation-state's sovereignty (Bazirake/Bukuluki 2015).

"Humanitarian intervention" is a second legal doctrine that permits military intervention in another country. Here, too, the normative point of reference for military intervention is the protection of universal individual rights against serious human rights abuses. If a state is not capable of protecting the individual right to life or actively violates it on a massive scale by committing genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, it rescinds its right to national self-determination, and other states are entitled to intervene by force. The most important difference between "Humanitarian intervention" and "Responsibility to protect" is that Humanitarian intervention only refers to the use of military force, whereas R2P consists of different measures, and the use of force may only be carried out as a measure of last resort. The "Humanitarian intervention" doctrine was most famously invoked in the context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) intervention in Kosovo in 1999 after the Security Council failed to act on its Chapter VII powers<sup>5</sup> due to the veto from Russia and China (Gray 2018: 40–58). However, it is opposed by many states because they fear that it may be used as a pretext for strategic intervention.

Even more controversial than the doctrine of "Humanitarian intervention" is that of a "Pro-democratic intervention" that seeks to alter the political

5 Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression", allows the Council to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to take military and nonmilitary action to "restore international peace and security" (United Nations 1945).

system of another country (Gray 2018: 64–68). Its stated aim is to liberate people from authoritarian regimes and introduce democracy in another country. The legitimating reference point here is the individual right to freely associate and install a form of government. This right rests on the consent of the governed, i.e. ultimately, on individual self-determination. It argues that interventions are justified to help the individuals of another state choose their form of government on free and equal terms. Examples include the imposition of democracies in Japan and Germany after WWII, the US interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and continued discussion in relation to Iran and North Korea. However, states have not attempted to provide any legal justifications for pro-democratic interventions and attempts to “import” democracy to another country have repeatedly failed in practice.

The core elements of the liberal script, as described in the previous section, and their materialisation in international law constitute the reference point for our empirical analysis. We asked citizens in 24 countries whether they think that the international community should have a right to intervene with military force if human rights are massively violated in a country. We did not ask whether such a military intervention must be authorised by the UN Security Council because we cannot assume that the citizens have a thorough knowledge of the institutions of the UN. Furthermore, we asked respondents whether they think the international community should have the right to intervene if a country is not ruled by its people but by a dictator, a question that attempts to measure attitudes towards “Pro-democratic intervention”. Hence, we examine whether the existing legal norms are supported by citizens’ belief in the legitimacy of these norms. As Max Weber (1985) outlined in his sociology of domination, the legitimacy of an order depends on whether its citizens believe in its legitimacy.

### 3 FACTORS THAT CAN INFLUENCE CITIZEN ATTITUDES TOWARD MILITARY HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

In the following section, we will attempt to theorise factors that may influence people’s attitudes regarding humanitarian intervention. We derive our hypotheses from two broader social science theories: From the neo-intuitionist notion of the existence of a world script on the one hand and the modernisation theory of value change on the other (for a similar approach to explaining attitudes toward gender equality, see Gerhards et al. 2009). The hypotheses derived from these two broader theories relate to (1) characteristics of the countries in which respondents live and by which they are influenced (macro-factors) and (2) characteristics of the individuals themselves.

Before we present the hypotheses, a preliminary remark is necessary. It seems important to distinguish analytically between the goal of military interventions – the protection of human rights – and the means employed – the use of force. We formulate our hypotheses in terms of factors that may influence the goal, namely, the enforcement of human rights. We will discuss later that those factors that can positively influence the support of human rights may, at the same time, have a negative influence on the means used (i.e. use of force) so that both influencing factors could neutralise each other. This neutralisation effect may result in our hypotheses not being confirmed or weakly supported.

#### 3.1 EMBEDDED IN AND COMMITTED TO THE LIBERAL SCRIPT

Neo-institutionalist theory assumes that the global cultural script and citizen values are linked; while they may be “de-coupled” at any given point in time, they are connected long term. One can assume that international organisations influence citizen attitudes by disseminating, diffusing, and

implementing the script into international law, national legislation, and political practices (Meyer et al. 1997). Accordingly, we assume that the more a country is embedded in the world culture and has adopted its principles, the more citizens are exposed to and show support for the script. There are several ways in which embeddedness into the liberal script can be operationalised and measured on a cross-country basis. We used the liberal component index from the “Varieties of Democracy Project” (V-Dem) (Coppedge et al. 2022). While some authors question the general validity of the democracy indices (e.g. Cheibub et al. 2010), Boese (2019) shows that compared to other indices (Polity2 and Freedom House Index), V-Dem stands out with respect to the underlying definition and measurement scale, as well as the theoretical justification of the aggregation procedure.<sup>6</sup>

We also attempt to measure the commitment to the liberal script at the individual level. As discussed above, the liberal script accords universal rights to every individual regardless of the country in which they live. In the PALS survey, respondents were asked whether they think that every human being, independent of the country where they live, should have the same basic rights. We assume that individuals who approve of the notion of the universality of human rights are more likely to support the content of the liberal script and, accordingly, advocate for humanitarian interventions.

### 3.2 MODERNISATION AND POSTMATERIALIST VALUES

In contrast to a neo-institutionalist approach, modernisation theory assumes that people’s attitudes do not result from their inclusion in a world script but the endogenous development of individual countries. Countries in our sample differ in their level of modernisation. As economic

prosperity increases through modernisation, a change in citizen values occurs. According to Ronald Inglehart and his collaborators (Inglehart 1971, 1997; Inglehart/Welzel 2005), a shift from materialist to postmaterialist values, or self-expression values, takes place when chances to satisfy material needs increase. Materialist values include the following: satisfying economic living conditions, security, national identity, and the exclusion of outsiders. Postmaterialist or self-expression values, in contrast, are characterised by the desire for self-fulfilment, an emphasis on freedom, participation, and the tolerance of diversity. “Rising resources mean that there’s enough to go around. Newcomers can be accommodated. Foreigners seem much less threatening; instead different cultures come to be seen as interesting and stimulating” (Inglehart 2006: 26). We assume that caring for people living in another country whose lives are endangered is part of a postmaterialist value syndrome, even though Inglehart himself and his collaborators do not link support for human rights to postmaterialist values, neither conceptually nor empirically. We expect that citizens from more modernised countries will support humanitarian intervention more strongly than respondents from less modernised countries. To measure modernisation, we use the Human Development Index (HDI), provided annually by the UN Development Programme.

The PALS data set contains a way to directly measure the impact of modernisation and postmaterialist values on attitudes towards humanitarian intervention, as it includes the materialism/postmaterialism index on the individual level. We test whether postmaterialists are more likely to support the idea of humanitarian intervention than materialists, independent of the level of modernisation of a country. To measure whether people tend to be more materialistic or postmaterialistic, we use Inglehart’s index (1971), which measures people’s priorities on what their country or government should do in the future.

<sup>6</sup> The correlation between Freedom House and V-Dem is very high for the countries in our study (92%), so it makes no difference which of the two indicators one uses.

Finally, we consider the respondent's level of education in our analysis. In principle, education stands for two different concepts: a person's socioeconomic status and the level of cognitive mobilisation, which then impacts people's values. Using attitudes toward immigration as an example, Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox (2007) demonstrate that education measures a form of cognitive mobilisation rather than social status. This reasoning is consistent with the argumentation of Ronald Inglehart, who describes the effect associated with higher levels of education as cognitive mobilisation and defines cognitive mobilisation as a process where formal education increases the likelihood that traditional concepts will be questioned and possibly rejected rather than being automatically accepted (Dalton 1984; Inglehart 1990). Questioning tradition can also refer to the sacred, untouchable sovereignty of the nation-state. We assume that more educated interviewees are more likely to have positive attitudes towards humanitarian intervention.

### 3.3 CONTROL VARIABLES

We include several control variables on the micro-level that may influence attitudes towards humanitarian intervention. We take into consideration those variables that have been shown to be relevant in other studies. These variables are the respondents' gender (Clements 2013; Fetchenhauer/Bierhoff 2004) and age (Boussios/Cole 2010; Fitzsimmons et al. 2014). Because these factors serve only as control variables we do not substantiate why they may impact attitudes toward humanitarian intervention.

## 4 DATA AND METHODS

We use data from the PALS Survey, which surveyed more than 49,000 individuals in 24 countries around the world between December 2021

and April 2022.<sup>7</sup> The survey focuses on attitudes toward freedom, liberal values, and normative attitudes about how a society should be organised and is part of the Berlin-based Cluster of Excellence "Contestations of the Liberal Script (SCRIPTS)". The target population in all 24 countries was permanent residents living in private households aged 18 or older in each country – regardless of their nationality. In 19 countries, the data was collected via computer-assisted web interviews (CAWI). Respondents were recruited from an online access panel administered by a collaborating survey company. The sample is stratified by gender, age, education, region of living, and place of locality in order to match the distribution of the respective country's offline population. Respondents received a small incentive for participation assigned by the survey company. In those five countries where online surveys were not feasible (especially due to too low Internet penetration), data was collected via personal interviews (CAPI) on the basis of a probability sample via the random-walk procedure. The survey was conducted in the most-spoken language(s) in each country.<sup>8</sup>

To ensure data quality, we use both *ex ante* and *post hoc* methods, which exclude respondents with insufficient interview quality from the sample. In a first step, we excluded respondents that failed an instructional manipulation check ("attention check") as proposed by Oppenheimer et al. (2009).<sup>9</sup> For the CAWI countries, we additionally excluded cases that were identified as "speeders" based on the procedure proposed by Robert Greszki et al. (2015: 478). According to the authors, "speeders are those respondents who need 50% or less of the median time in their

7 The data used in this analysis is preliminary data that might slightly change until the finalization and public release of the PALS dataset in the coming months.

8 See Appendix 1 for an overview of survey countries, sample sizes, modes, and questionnaire languages.

9 The PALS survey contained an item asking respondents to tick a specific scale point on a six-point Likert scale; 11% of the respondents failed to do so.



combined age and education group per country on each respective item used in the analysis. These two procedures resulted in 6,390 deletions because of the failed attention check and 6,857 additional deletions due to speeding. In addition, those respondents with missing values on any of the variables used in the analysis are excluded (3,717). This leaves us with 32,964 valid cases. We applied weights for gender by age, education, region, and type of locality to approximate our sample characteristics to the national populations for all countries. In addition, each country is considered equally to determine country differences.

This study focuses on the question of the extent to which citizens in different countries of the world support the idea that the international community may invade another country militarily when human rights are violated. In addition, we are interested in people's attitudes towards military intervention if a country is not ruled by its people but by a dictator. Two items in the PALS survey allow us to measure people's attitudes toward these scenarios.<sup>10</sup> Respondents were asked the following questions:

*"Some people argue that under certain circumstances, the international community should have the right to intervene in other countries. Others argue that a country's independence should always be respected. To what extent would you agree or disagree to each of the following statements?"*

*"What if human rights are massively violated in a country? The international community should have the right to intervene with military force."*

*"What if a country is not ruled by its people but by a dictator? The international community should have the right to intervene with military force."*

Agreement is measured on a six-point scale. In addition, respondents were given the options "I prefer not to say" and "Don't know". We will discuss in the conclusion how the wording of the questions might have influenced the answers given by the respondents. As already mentioned, we did not ask whether a military intervention must be authorised by the UN Security Council because we cannot assume that the citizens have sufficient knowledge of the institutions of the UN to understand and answer the question.

Military intervention is only one means of sanctioning a country; economic sanctions are a second possibility. For both scenarios – massive violation of human rights and the existence of a dictator – we also asked whether citizens think that *"The international community should have the right to sanction the country economically"*. Again, agreement is measured on a six-point scale. As we will discuss further, the questions about economic sanctions allow us to check whether factors that can positively influence support of human rights may, at the same time, have a negative influence on the use of force so that these influencing factors neutralise each other. While we cannot clearly isolate these two attitudes from each other, the question of economic interventions as a response to violations of human rights allows us to identify differences between individuals' attitudes towards different forms of interventions used for the same goal.

To measure a country's embeddedness in the liberal script, we use the liberal component index of the "Varieties of Democracy Project" (V-Dem) (Coppedge et al. 2022). In V-Dem's understanding, liberal democracy "embodies the intrinsic value of protecting individual and minority rights against a potential 'tyranny of the majority' and state repression more generally" (Coppedge et al. 2016: 582). The index is based on expert evaluations of a country's constitutionally protected civil liberties as well as the degree that the rule of law

10 For all dependent, independent, and control variables see Appendix 2 with a detailed overview on the wording of the variables used as well as distributions in our sample.

and checks and balances limit the use of executive power (Coppedge et al. 2016: 582).

To measure respondents' individual commitment to the liberal script, we use PALS' measure of the universality of human rights. The question reads as follows: *"Should every human have the same basic rights in all countries or should a country's society decide which rights people have in its country?"* Respondents were asked to place themselves on a six-point scale with *"1 – Every human should have the same basic rights in all countries"* and *"6 – A country's society should decide which rights people have in its country"* as endpoints. According to the liberal script, the universality of human rights is non-negotiable. We thus reversed the scale with high values now signifying a commitment to the liberal script. The two variables measuring postmaterialist values and a commitment to the liberal script are only weakly correlated with each other in our sample (.07), which means that they are valid indicators measuring two distinct concepts.

To measure the level of modernisation of a country, we use the Human Development Index (HDI), provided annually by the UN (United Nations Development Programme 2021). The HDI consists of three measures: real Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, education levels (including enrolment ratios for primary, secondary, and tertiary education), and average life expectancy. Materialist attitudes are measured with the Inglehart index, which is based on the following items: *"There are different opinions about what society's goals should be for the next ten years. Below are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Please, pick the two that are most important to you: (1) Maintaining order in the nation, (2) Giving people more say in government decisions, (3) Fighting rising prices, (4) Protecting freedom of speech."* Respondents who selected (1) and (3) are classified as "materialists", those who selected (2) and (4) are classified as

"postmaterialists", and all others as "in-between". In our analysis, we compare "postmaterialists" to the two other categories.

Education is measured based on the respondents' highest educational attainment. Answer options are country-specific but equivalised based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-2011). We clustered the education categories into three groups: (1) low education (ISCED 0–2, lower secondary education or less); (2) medium (ISCED 3–4, upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education); (3) high (ISCED 5–8, tertiary education or higher).

The fact that respondents were interviewed in 24 countries allows us to take into consideration explanatory factors at the country and the individual level. The appropriate method is a multi-level analysis with respondents nested within countries.<sup>11</sup> As suggested by Joop Hox (2010: 55–59), we use a "bottom-up" modelling procedure. We estimate a null model before adding the variables (first the individual, then the country variables) first, one by one, then in combination with the control variables, until a final model is obtained in which all variables are included.


## 5 RESULTS

The results are presented in the following order. We start by describing country differences in the degree of support for humanitarian military intervention. In a second step, we analyse the influence of individual variables on support for military intervention. Third, we consider the influence of macro factors, and the interplay between

<sup>11</sup> Statistically, the null model (see Model 0 in Appendix 4) yields an intra-correlation coefficient (ICC) of .043. About 4% of the variability in respondent attitudes towards interventions is due to differences at the country level, which justifies a multilevel approach. However, as the ICC is relatively small, we estimate a fixed effects model as a robustness check, which produces similar results (see Model 22 in Appendix 9).



Figure 1: Approval of military intervention in case of human rights violations



Note: N=32,964, post-stratification weights on the individual level, as well as country weights adjusting the different sample sizes for the mean bar.

contextual and individual characteristics. Finally, we analyse whether attitudes towards humanitarian military intervention are influenced by a potential neutralisation effect.

## 5.1 COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION

We dichotomised the six-point scale measuring the level of support for humanitarian intervention; the upper half being approval, the lower half being disapproval. As Figure 1 shows, 56% of citizens in the 24 countries support the idea that the international community should have the right to intervene with military force in a country if human rights are massively violated. The approval rate is similarly high in case a country is ruled by a dictator.<sup>12</sup> Thus, individuals apparently make


no distinction between deposing a dictator and enforcing human rights. Since this is the case, we focus solely on the question of the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in subsequent analyses. We conducted all of the multivariate analyses presented in this section also for the dictatorship item; the analyses arrived at very similar results.<sup>13</sup>

Although the majority of citizens overall are in favour of military humanitarian intervention, Figure 1 also demonstrates that there are major country differences: While in a large number of countries, the majority of the population supports military intervention, in five countries, opposition to such action predominates. Russia has by far the lowest approval rating. Only 27% of those surveyed support military intervention in the case of human rights violations (in the case of a dictatorship, the

<sup>12</sup> See Appendix 3 for the descriptive figures.

<sup>13</sup> See Appendix 8 (Model 20 and 21) for the regression results.

Figure 2: Individual-level effects on support for humanitarian military intervention



Note: N=32,964, post-stratification weights on the individual level, as well as country weights adjusting the different sample sizes. See Appendix 4 for the regression table of the underlying model (Model 10).

figure is only 25%). The majority of respondents in Italy, Germany and Japan, the three Axis powers of WWII, and Ghana also disapprove of military intervention in the case of human rights violations. The highest levels of approval are found in Spain, India, and France (more than two-thirds of respondents in each case).

## 5.2 INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL EXPLANATORY FACTORS

The hypotheses derived from neo-institutionalism and modernisation theory expect that a) respondents with a higher commitment to the liberal script and b) respondents with postmaterialist values and higher levels of education are more likely to support humanitarian military interventions. Figure 2 shows the result from a multilevel linear regression model with individual-level variables explaining support for humanitarian

military intervention.<sup>14</sup> The model contains random intercepts at the country level and was estimated using maximum likelihood estimation.<sup>15</sup> The graph shows the coefficients for each explanatory variable with 95% confidence intervals.

Concerning commitment to the liberal script, Figure 2 shows that persons are more in favour of humanitarian military intervention the more they

<sup>14</sup> See Model 10 in Appendix 4 for the regression table and Model 0-Model 9 for the previous iterations of the model-building sequence.

<sup>15</sup> As restricted maximum likelihood estimation (REML) is sometimes recommended in the literature as preferable over maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) for analyses with only a few cluster-level units (e.g. Elff et al. 2021; Stegmueller 2013) we conducted a robustness check using REML. However, as Stata does not allow the inclusion of weights for REML, we compare the REML model to an MLE without weights. The substantive results are identical between both models, indicating that even for the MLE model presented in Figure 2, an estimation with REML would not lead to substantially different results; see Model 23 and Model 24 in Appendix 10.

support universal rights for all people independent of the society they live in, although the correlation is relatively small: one unit increase in the preferences for universal rights results only in a .03 unit increase in the support for humanitarian military intervention. But even though the correlation turns out to be small, the hypotheses derived from neo-institutionalist theory are supported in principle, whereby a stronger commitment to the liberal script results in higher levels of support for humanitarian interventions.

The two indicators related to modernisation theory – having postmaterialist values and high levels of education – do surprisingly not point in the theoretically expected direction and do not show any statistically significant effects. Hence, the hypotheses that higher-educated individuals differ from lower-educated individuals and that post-materialists differ from the rest of the population in their attitudes toward humanitarian intervention are not supported by the results of our analysis. In Section 5.4, we discuss that this finding may be due to a neutralisation effect stemming from the formulation of the questions.

### 5.3 COUNTRY-LEVEL EXPLANATORY FACTORS

To what extent do country-specific contextual characteristics impact the support for humanitarian military interventions? For a first impression of how the distribution of support between countries is related to contextual factors, we plot the random intercepts from the regression model presented in Figure 2 against the country-level explanatory variables derived from the two theories. The random intercepts depict the level of support in each country, which is already controlled for country differences in the composition of the population on the key explanatory variables and the controls included in the regression model from Figure 2. The HDI represents the level of modernisation of the countries, whereas

the liberal component index of V-Dem represents the level of embeddedness into the global liberal script.

Figure 3 shows the scatterplots of the country intercepts against the two respective macro variables, which have been standardised to a mean value of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Two aspects are observable from these graphs: first, there is considerable variation in the level of support for humanitarian military intervention between the countries. Second, the slope of the V-Dem indicator is much steeper than the slope of the HDI, meaning that embeddedness into the liberal script is a better predictor of the level of support than the modernisation of a country. Similar to the result at the individual level, these findings point in the direction of neo-institutionalist theory having more explanatory power than modernisation theory on the macro level.


However, both indicators are correlated in our country sample (.33) and could therefore confound the effect of each other. To control for this, we estimate a multilevel model with the same specification used for Figure 2 but includes both the HDI and the V-Dem indicators on the country level. The results are presented in Figure 4.<sup>16</sup>

As expected, the coefficients on the individual level do not change from the model without the country level (Figure 2). Similarly, as expected, the unexplained variance at the country level and, correspondingly, the ICC decreases after including the country-level variables.

At first glance, the results in Figure 4 confirm the results of the scatterplots in Figure 3. There is no significant relationship between a country's level of modernisation measured by the HDI and its support for humanitarian military intervention.


<sup>16</sup> See the Appendix 5 for the full regression table (Model 13), as well as the models including the two-country factors individually (Model 11 and Model 12).

Figure 3: Country differences in support for humanitarian military intervention



Note: N=32,964, post-stratification weights on the individual level. Y-axis: Random intercepts from the model presented in Figure 2.

Figure 4: Country-level effects on support for humanitarian military interventions



Note: N=32,964, post-stratification weights on the individual level, as well as country weights adjusting the different sample sizes. See Appendix 5 for the regression table of the underlying model (Model 13).

However, although the relationship between V-Dem and support for military intervention goes in the theoretically expected direction, the coefficient is statistically not significant at the 95% level but only at the 90% level. Finally, the intra-class-correlation index ( $ICC = .04$ ) indicates that there is not much variance that can be explained at the country level.

#### 5.4 THE NEUTRALISATION EFFECT

So far, the results have only partially met our theoretical expectations. First, there seems to be no correlation between the level of a country's modernisation and respondents' postmaterialist attitudes and support for military humanitarian intervention. Second, only the individual-level indicator for the commitment to the liberal script has a statistically significant effect on attitudes towards military intervention, whereas the relationship between V-Dem and support for military intervention goes in the expected direction but is not significant. Moreover, the ICC shows that not much variation in the attitudes towards humanitarian military intervention resides at the country level. Third, all variables derived from the two theories, as well as the control variables, cannot explain much of the variance of the dependent variable. An OLS regression model that includes country fixed-effects and the same individual-level variables as the model presented in Figure 2 only shows an  $R^2$  of .05, indicating that a great deal of noise in the data and other unexplained factors are driving attitudes towards humanitarian military interventions.

Next, we investigate a potential explanation for the lack of explanatory power of our models and hypotheses. It seems like the indicators related to modernisation especially defy our expectations. As already mentioned, we expect the existence of a kind of neutralisation effect, whereby people who are in favour of the protection of human rights do not support the use of military intervention as a


tool for achieving that goal. More specifically, we assume that higher levels of education and post-materialist values lead to a concern for the protection of human rights but are at the same time related to a commitment to pacifism and disapproval of using military force to achieve political goals. Thus, the fact that the hypotheses derived from modernisation theory are not confirmed could be the result of a neutralisation effect whereby support for the protection of human rights is counteracted by disapproval of the use of military force.

To test this assumption, we make use of an additional item from the questionnaire, which asks respondents about their level of support for economically sanctioning a country where human rights are massively violated. The wording of the item contains the same goal, namely the protection of human rights, but does not include the use of military force. Accordingly, we suspect that, in this case, the hypotheses derived from modernisation theory should be confirmed. Figure 5 compares the effects of the individual-level variables on the support for the two different items. The regression model with the military intervention item is identical to the one shown in Figure 2, while for the model with the economic intervention item, the dependent variable has been changed.<sup>17</sup>

The results show that, compared to support for military intervention, the direction of the effect has changed for both variables derived from modernisation theory. While the now-positive effect of postmaterialism is not statistically significant, there is a significant relationship between education and the support of economic interventions, indicating that persons with medium and high levels of education are significantly more in favour of economic interventions than persons with low levels of education. We interpret these differences as a sign of the neutralisation effect, meaning that

<sup>17</sup> See Appendix 6 for the model with attitudes towards humanitarian economic intervention (Model 14).

Figure 5: Comparing support for military intervention with support for economic sanctions



Note: N=32,964, post-stratification weights on the individual level, as well as country weights adjusting the different sample sizes. See Appendices 4 and 6 for the regression tables of the underlying models (Models 10 and 14).

modernisation theory does, in part, predict the support for humanitarian intervention once we “control” for the neutralisation effect by comparing the support for the two different items. This change in the direction of the indicators related to modernisation theory can also be observed at the country level. We additionally estimate the full multilevel model with the two country indicators included, which shows a statistically significant positive effect of the HDI on support for economic sanctions.<sup>18</sup>

Concerning the remaining coefficients depicted in Figure 5, the effect of support for universal rights, notably, does not change from one item to the other, suggesting that a commitment to the liberal script results in support for human rights interventions regardless of the means of


the intervention. A look at the control variables reveals that there are also differences between the two items. If human rights are to be enforced with economic sanctions, older people are more likely to be in favour of this, whereas women are more likely to be against it.

Taking these results as a first indication of the neutralisation effect, we estimate an additional model in which the dependent variable is the difference between the support for humanitarian economic sanctions and military interventions. Subtracting the latter from the former results in a variable that measures attitudes toward human rights intervention adjusted for the effect of attitudes towards military intervention in general. Positive values indicate stronger support for economic sanctions than for military sanctions. The higher the positive value, the greater the neutralisation effect (i.e. the difference between

<sup>18</sup> See Appendix 6 for the regression results (Model 15).



Figure 6: Neutralisation effect – effects on attitudes toward human rights interventions adjusted for the effect of attitudes towards military intervention



Note: N=32,964, post-stratification weights on the individual level, as well as country weights adjusting the different sample sizes. See Appendix 7 for the regression table of the underlying model (Model 18).

economic and military intervention). Correspondingly, negative values indicate stronger support for military intervention than for economic sanctions, which we interpret as people valuing military intervention more than the goal of protecting human rights. In our sample, 46% indicate the same level of support for military and economic intervention, while 37% indicate more positive attitudes towards economic interventions (“pacifists”, for which the neutralisation effect applies) and 17% indicate more positive attitudes towards military interventions (“militarists”). The additional model is calculated in order to explain the different acceptance patterns. Figure 6 presents the results from the regression model.

The results confirm those from Figure 5, whereby the individual-level indicators for modernisation theory, postmaterialism and education show

positive effects in favour of the commitment to the protection of human rights but an aversion towards the use of military force for achieving that goal. Similarly, the country-level indicator for modernisation theory, the HDI, shows a statistically significant positive effect. This means that persons living in countries with higher levels of socio-economic development are more likely to favour economic sanctions than military interventions as a tool for protecting human rights. The neutralisation effect is much less evident for the indicators related to commitment to the liberal script. While support for universal rights does show a statistically significant positive effect, albeit a very small one, the V-Dem indicator does not.



## 6 CONCLUSION

According to international law, waging war against another country violates the principle of territorial sovereignty of all nation-states. There is one exception to this principle. If human rights are massively violated in a country, the international community has the right to intervene militarily. The legitimacy of this exception is grounded in the notion, constitutive to the liberal script, that every human being has fundamental rights, regardless of the country in which they live. Based on the novel PALS data set, a global comparative mass population survey covering 24 countries that are heterogeneous in terms of political regimes, socio-economic development, and cultural orientations, we explored the extent to which citizens support the idea that the international community may invade another country militarily when human rights are violated, and which factors can help to explain differences in citizen attitudes.

Results show that a majority of all respondents (56%) support the notion that military intervention in another country is legitimate when human rights are violated. The support rate is even higher if human rights are protected not by military intervention but by economic sanctions. In light of recent developments, such as the global contestations of liberalism, the backlash against globalisation and international organisations (Walter 2021), as well as the (reasonable) critique of military interventions by Western countries in the name of human rights around the world, the high level of support for the enforcement of human rights by the international community is somewhat surprising and encouraging, at least for those who give the protection of human rights a high priority.

At the same time, we find substantial country differences in citizen attitudes toward military humanitarian intervention. While there is a large body of public opinion research on citizen

attitudes toward specific military interventions (especially US interventions), studies are rare that attempt to explain a) generalised attitudes about the legitimacy of humanitarian military intervention independent of specific individual cases and b) with reference to more general theories. We derive our hypotheses from two broader theories: the neo-intuitionist notion of the existence of a world script on the one hand and the modernisation theory of value change on the other. We argue that individuals' attitudes are structured by their location within a liberal country and their commitment to the liberal script, which ascribes a higher value to individual self-determination and the universality of human rights over the sovereignty of nation-states. Furthermore, we assume that a country's level of modernisation and a respondent's level of education and postmaterialist values influence their attitude toward military intervention.

Results from the multivariate analysis demonstrate that on the individual level, people's commitment to the liberal script predicts support for military humanitarian intervention, while the indicators of modernisation theory, having postmaterialist values and higher levels of education, do not. Similarly, on the country level, the level of socio-economic development does not positively correlate with support for humanitarian military intervention, whereas the degree of embeddedness into the liberal script does, although the coefficient is statistically significant only at the 90% level. Thus, the first set of results indicates that the commitment to the liberal script has a larger explanatory power for attitudes towards humanitarian military interventions than modernisation theory.

In a second step of the analysis, we examine whether the results are influenced by a "neutralisation effect". We suspect that individuals who generally support the protection of human rights are opposed to using military force, which might

bias their responses towards humanitarian military intervention. Making use of an additional item of the survey that measures support for economic sanctions as means of protecting human rights, we showed that the indicators for modernisation theory are indeed influenced by the neutralisation effect and that people with post-materialist values and higher levels of education generally support the protection of human rights by the international community but are not in favour of the use of military force to enact that goal.

Our findings should be taken with some caution due to the following limitations of the study. First, we are not able to measure causal effects or analyse the specific mechanisms with which, for example, a commitment to the liberal script results in support for humanitarian military intervention. One of these mechanisms, which we, unfortunately, cannot operationalise, could be that liberal societies are more likely to ensure that liberal values are taught in schools and that people in liberal societies are, therefore, more likely to advocate for the protection of human rights. Second, although the descriptive analyses have shown that countries differ in their approval of military humanitarian intervention, we can only explain these differences to a small extent. While we find statistically significant effects, there is still a large amount of unexplained variance and thus unexplored factors structuring attitudes towards human rights intervention. This result might support the position of social scientists using historically comparative methods who have criticised systematic comparative analyses that try to explain country differences with relatively broad indices (e.g. Mahoney 2004). According to them, studies like ours have limitations as they do not do justice to the historical developments and the specific characteristics of individual countries that may influence, for example, the understanding of the questions formulated in the survey and, thus, the results. To give an example: The phrase “*the international community* should intervene with

military force” can trigger different associations in different countries. Respondents living in former colonies or countries under strong US influence may be thinking primarily of the US, which has in the past engaged in de facto military interventions, often to expand its own influence but publicly legitimised as an intervention to protect human rights or to replace a dictator. Such an association may, of course, influence how respondents answered the survey question. Unfortunately, we are unable to determine to what extent the questions asked in the survey triggered different associations and consequently led to different responses. To find this out, additional qualitative studies, for example, focus group discussions, might be useful.

## REFERENCES

- Bazirake, Joseph Besigye / Bukuluki, Paul 2015: A Critical Reflection on the Conceptual and Practical Limitations of the Responsibility to Protect, *The International Journal of Human Rights* 19(8): 1017–1028.
- Bizumic, Boris / Stubager, Rune / Mellon, Scott / van der Linden, Nicolas / Iyer, Ravi / Jones, Benjamin M. 2013: On the (In)Compatibility of Attitudes Toward Peace and War, *Political Psychology* 34(5): 673–694.
- Blumberg, Herbert H. / Zeligman, Ruth / Appel, Liat / Tibon-Czopp, Shira 2017: Personality Dimensions and Attitudes towards Peace and War, *Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research* 9(1): 13–23.
- Boese, Vanessa A. 2019: How (Not) to Measure Democracy, *International Area Studies Review* 22(2): 95–127.
- Börzel, Tanja A. / Zürn, Michael 2020: Contestations of the Liberal Script. A Research Program, SCRIPTS Working Paper No. 1, Berlin: Cluster of Excellence 2055 “Contestations of the Liberal Script - SCRIPTS”.
- Boussios, Emanuel Gregory / Cole, Stephen 2010: Do Individual Characteristics Matter? An Analysis of Americans’ Opinions toward the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars, *Journal of Applied Security Research* 5(3): 279–305.
- Boussios, Emanuel / Cole, Stephen 2012: An Analysis of Under What Conditions Americans Support the Use of Military Force Abroad in Terrorist and Humanitarian Situations, *Journal of Applied Security Research* 7(4): 417–438.
- Cavarra, Mauro / Canegallo, Virginia / Santoddi, Erika / Broccoli, Erika / Fabio, Rosa Angela 2021: Peace and Personality. The Relationship between the Five-Factor Model’s Personality Traits and the Peace Attitude Scale, *Peace and Conflict, Journal of Peace Psychology* 27(3): 508–511.
- Cheibub, José Antonio / Gandhi, Jennifer / Vreeland, James Raymond 2010: Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited, *Public Choice* 143(1–2): 67–101.
- Clements, Ben 2013: Public Opinion and Military Intervention. Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, *The Political Quarterly* 84(1): 119–131.
- Coppedge, Michael / Gerring, John / Knutsen, Carl H. / Lindberg, Staffan I. / Skaaning, Svend-Erik / Teorell, Jan / Altman, David / Bernhard, Michael / Fish, M. Steven / Cornell, Agnes / Gjerløw, Haakon / Glynn, Adam / Hicken, Allen / Krusell, Joshua / Marquardt, Kyle L. / McMann, Kelly / Mechkova, Valeriya / Medzihorsky, Juraj / Gastaldi, Lisa / Paxton, Pamela / Pemstein, Daniel / von Römer, Johannes / Hindle, Garry / Seim, Brigitte / Sigman, Rachel / Staton, Jeffrey / Alizada, Nazifa / Tzelgov, Eitan / Wang, Yi-ting / Wig, Tore / Wilson, Steven / Ziblatt, Daniel / Ilchenko, Nina / Grahn, Sandra / Kinzelbach, Katrin / Rydén, Oskar (2022): V-Dem Dataset 2022, Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy, <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds22> (accessed 25 August 2022).
- Coppedge, Michael / Lindberg, Staffan / Skaaning, Svend-Erik / Teorell, Jan 2016: Measuring High Level Democratic Principles Using the V-Dem Data, *International Political Science Review* 37(5): 580–593.
- Coticchia, Fabrizio 2015: Effective Strategic Narratives? Italian Public Opinion and Military Operations in Iraq, Libya, and Lebanon, *Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Ital-iana di Scienza Politica*, 45(1): 53–78.
- Crowson, H. Michael 2004: Human Rights Attitudes. Dimensionality and Psychological Correlates, *Ethics & Behavior* 14(3): 235–253.
- Crowson, H. Michael 2009: Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation, *Social Psychology* 40(2): 93–103.
- Dalton, Russell J. 1984: Cognitive Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment in Advanced Industrial Democracies, *The Journal of Politics* 46(1): 264–284.
- Drewski, Daniel / Gerhards, Jürgen 2020: The Liberal Border Script and Its Contestations. An Attempt of Definition and Systematization, SCRIPTS Working Paper No. 4, Berlin: Cluster of Excellence 2055 “Contestations of the Liberal Script - SCRIPTS”.

- Dupuis, Erin / Cohn, Ellen 2011: A New Scale to Measure War Attitudes. Construction and Predictors, *Journal of Psychological Arts & Sciences* 14: 6–15.
- Elff, Martin / Heisig, Jan Paul / Schaeffer, Merlin / Shikano, Susumu 2021: Multilevel Analysis with Few Clusters. Improving Likelihood-Based Methods to Provide Unbiased Estimates and Accurate Inference, *British Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 412–426.
- Elliott, Michael A. 2007: Human Rights and the Triumph of the Individual in World Culture, *Cultural Sociology* 1(3): 343–363.
- Fetchenhauer, Detlef / Bierhoff, Hans-Werner 2004: Attitudes Toward a Military Enforcement of Human Rights, *Social Justice Research* 17(1): 75–92.
- Fitzsimmons, Scott / Craigie, Allan / Bodet, Marc André 2014: Canadian Public Opinion about the Military. Assessing the Influences on Attitudes toward Defence Spending and Participation in Overseas Combat Operations, *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 47(3): 503–518.
- Gerhards, Jürgen / Schäfer, Mike S. / Kämpfer, Sylvia 2009: Gender Equality in the European Union. The EU Script and Its Support by European Citizens, *Sociology* 43(3): 515–534.
- Gray, Christine D. 2018: International Law and the Use of Force, 4th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Greszki, Robert / Meyer, Marco / Schoen, Harald 2015: Exploring the Effects of Removing ‘Too Fast’ Responses and Respondents from Web Surveys, *Public Opinion Quarterly* 79(2): 471–503.
- Hainmueller, Jens / Hiscox, Michael J. 2007: Educated Preferences. Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe, *International Organization* 61(2): 399–442.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. 1992: Nations and Nationalism since 1780, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hox, Joop J. 2010: Multilevel Analysis, 2nd edition, New York, NY: Routledge.
- Inglehart, Ronald 1971: The Silent Revolution in Europe. Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies, *American Political Science Review* 65(4): 991–1017.
- Inglehart, Ronald 1990: Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald 1997: Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald 2006: Changing Norms. Existential Security Leads to Growing Acceptance of Out-Groups, *WZB-Mitteilungen* 113: 26–29.
- Inglehart, Ronald / Welzel, Christian 2005: Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy. The Human Development Sequence, Cambridge, UK/New York: Cambridge University Press.
- International Court of Justice 1986: Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Den Haag: International Court of Justice, <https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/70/070-19860627-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf> (accessed 25 August 2022).
- Lowe, Vaughan / Tzanakopoulos, Antonios 2014: Humanitarian Intervention. In: Wolfrum, Rüdiger (ed.): Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, <https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e306> (accessed 11 July 2022).
- Mahoney, James 2004: Comparative-Historical Methodology, *Annual Review of Sociology* 30(1): 81–101.
- Maier, Charles S. 2016: Once within Borders, Cambridge, Massachusetts/London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Meyer, John W. 2010: World Society, Institutional Theories, and the Actor, *Annual Review of Sociology* 36(1): 1–20.
- Meyer, John W. / Boli, John / Thomas, George M. / Ramirez, Francisco O. 1997: World Society and the Nation-State, *American Journal of Sociology* 103(1): 144–181.

- Meyer, John W. / Jepperson, Ronald L. 2000: The 'Actors' of Modern Society. The Cultural Construction of Social Agency, *Sociological Theory* 18(1): 100–120.
- Oppenheimer, Daniel M. / Meyvis, Tom / Davidenko, Nicolas 2009: Instructional Manipulation Checks. Detecting Satisficing to Increase Statistical Power, *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 45(4): 867–872.
- Ringsmose, Jens / Børgesen, Berit Kaja 2011: Shaping Public Attitudes towards the Deployment of Military Power. NATO, Afghanistan and the Use of Strategic Narratives, *European Security* 20(4): 505–528.
- Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoğlu 1994: Limits of Citizenship, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Stegmüller, Daniel 2013: How Many Countries for Multilevel Modeling? A Comparison of Frequentist and Bayesian Approaches, *American Journal of Political Science* 57(3): 748–761.
- Swami, Viren / Nader, Ingo W. / Pietschnig, Jakob / Stieger, Stefan / Tran, Ulrich S. / Voracek, Martin 2012: Personality and Individual Difference Correlates of Attitudes toward Human Rights and Civil Liberties, *Personality and Individual Differences* 53(4): 443–447.
- United Nations 1945: United Nations Charter, New York: United Nations, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter> (accessed 25 August 2022).
- United Nations 1948: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, New York: United Nations, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights> (accessed 25 August 2022).
- United Nations 2022: Aggression against Ukraine. Resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, New York: United Nations, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3959039> (accessed 8 July 2022).
- United Nations Development Programme 2021: Human Development Index (HDI), New York: United Nations Development Programme, <https://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi> (accessed 25 August 2022).
- Walter, Stefanie 2021: The Backlash Against Globalization, *Annual Review of Political Science* 24(1): 421–442.
- Weber, Max 1985: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 5th edition, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Zürn, Michael / Gerschewski, Johannes (2021): A Target of Contestations. Sketching the Liberal Script, SCRIPTS Working Paper 10 Berlin: Cluster of Excellence 2055 "Contestations of the Liberal Script (SCRIPTS)".

## SUPPLEMENTARY DATA

## Appendix 1: Country samples

Country	Mode	Languages	Fieldwork period	Cases included in the analysis
Australia	CAWI	English	20.12.21–16.01.22	1246
Brazil	CAWI	Portuguese	23.12.21–16.01.22	1313
Chile	CAWI	Spanish	23.12.21–28.01.22	1466
France	CAWI	French	22.12.21–24.01.22	1339
Germany	CAWI	German	13.12.21–07.01.22	1340
Ghana	CAPI	Akan, English	25.01.22–23.03.22	1195
India	CAPI	Bengali, Gujarati, English, Hindi, Marathi, Punjabi, Tamil, Telugu	15.02.22–31.03.22	2358
Indonesia	CAWI	Indonesia, Javanese	24.12.21–08.03.22	1180
Italy	CAWI	Italian	20.12.21–12.01.22	1369
Japan	CAWI	Japanese	24.12.21–28.02.22	1286
Latvia	CAWI	Latvian, Russian	21.12.21–29.01.22	1424
Mexico	CAWI	Spanish	22.12.21–22.01.22	1395
Nigeria	CAPI	English, Igbo, Hausa, Yoruba	08.02.22–19.03.22	1433
Poland	CAWI	Polish	20.12.21–13.01.22	1279
Russia	CAWI	Russian	21.12.21–03.02.22	1554
Senegal	CAPI	French, Wolof	18.02.22–11.04.22	1375
Singapore	CAWI	English, Malay, Mandarin	20.12.21–25.01.22	1257
South Africa	CAPI	Afrikaans, Xhosa, English, Zulu	04.02.22–12.03.22	1494
South Korea	CAWI	Korean	21.12.21–20.01.22	1471
Spain	CAWI	Catalan, Spanish	22.12.21–17.01.22	1481
Sweden	CAWI	Swedish	09.12.21–15.01.22	1168
Turkey	CAWI	Turkish	20.12.21–28.01.22	1157
United Kingdom	CAWI	English	17.12.21–06.03.22	1192
USA	CAWI	English, Spanish	22.12.21–11.01.22	1192




## Appendix 2: Description of the variables

Variable Description	Manifestation	Weighted proportion in used sample
<b>Dependent variables</b>		
<b>Intervention in other countries</b>		
Some people argue that under certain circumstances, the international community should have the right to intervene in other countries. Others argue that a country's independence should always be respected. To what extent would you agree or disagree to each of the following statements? Note: The order of (1) and (2) as well as (a) and (b) is randomized.		
(1) What if human rights are massively violated in a country?	1	14.49 %
(a) The international community should have the right to sanction the country economically.	2	6.69%
(1) 1 – Fully disagree	3	11.87%
(2) 2	4	18.62%
(3) 3	5	16.47%
(4) 4	6	31.86%
(5) 5		
(6) 6 – Fully agree		
(b) The international community should have the right to intervene with military force.	1	19.06%
<i>Same scale</i>	2	9.82%
	3	14.77%
	4	19.57%
	5	14.12%
	6	22.66%
(2) What if a country is not ruled by its people but by a dictator?	1	16.29%
(a) The international community should have the right to sanction the country economically.	2	6.93%
<i>Same scale</i>	3	12.06%
	4	17.30%
	5	15.82%
	6	31.59%
(b) The international community should have the right to intervene with military force.	1	20.29%
<i>Same scale</i>	2	10.19%
	3	14.45%
	4	18.06%
	5	13.28%
	6	23.72%



Variable Description	Manifestation	Weighted proportion in used sample
<b>Independent variables</b>		
<b>(1) Commitment to universality of human rights</b>		
Should every human have the same basic rights in all countries or should a country's society decide which rights people have in its country?  1 – Every human should have the same basic rights in all countries. 2 3 4 5 6 – A country's society should decide which rights people have in its country.  (Item was reversed for the analyses. Distribution for reversed item)	1	14.25%
	2	5.74%
	3	6.99%
	4	8.62%
	5	11.12%
	6	53.29%
<b>(2) Postmaterialism</b>		
There are different opinions about what society's goals should be for the next ten years. Below are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Please, pick the two that are most important to you.  (1) Maintaining order in the nation (2) Giving people more say in important government decision. (3) Fighting rising prices. (4) Protecting freedom of speech.  Recoded: Respondents who selected (1) and (3) are classified as 'materialists'. Those who selected (2) and (4) are classified as 'postmaterialists'. All others as 'in-between'. In our analysis, we compare 'postmaterialists' to the rest.	postmaterial-ists	14.25%
	materialists	85.75%
<b>(3) Education</b>		
What is the highest educational level that you have attained? If you have attained your highest educational degree outside [COUNTRY], please select the educational level that comes closest to the highest educational level that you have attained elsewhere.  Country-specific categories based for: (1) Less than lower secondary education (including no formal education, early childhood education, primary education) (ISCED 0-1) (2) Lower secondary education (ISCED 2) (3) Upper secondary education (ISCED 3) (4) Post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 4) (5) Lower tertiary education, BA level (including short-cycle tertiary education) (ISCED 5 - 6) (6) Higher tertiary education, MA level or higher (ISCED 7-8) (7) Still in education, without prior degree  Recoded: Categories were clustered into three groups: (1) low education (ISCED 0-2, lower secondary education or less); (2) medium (ISCED 3-4, upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education); (3) high (ISCED 5-8, tertiary education or higher).	low	30.25%
	middle	40.03%
	high	29.72%

Variable Description	Manifestation	Weighted proportion in used sample
<b>Control Variables</b>		
<b>Gender</b>		
Do you identify as... (1) ...male? (2) ...female? (3) ...other?  In total, only 0.22% of the respondents selected “(3) other”. We omitted those cases for our analysis.	male	49.33%
	female	50.67%
<b>Age</b>		
When were you born? Please give us your birth year.  Recoded to the following age groups: (1) 18 - 34 (2) 34 - 54 (3) 55+	18 - 34	34.78%
	34 - 54	32.83%
	55+	32.40%
<b>Country-level variables</b>		
<b>Human Development Index</b>		
The HDI is based on three dimensions: life expectancy at birth; mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling, Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (in US\$-PPP): 1. Life Expectancy Index: 2. Education Index: 3. Income Index:  Source: United Nations Development Programme (2021) Recode: In the analyses, we use a z-standardized version of the HDI.	Mean	.05
	Standard deviation	.99
<b>V-Dem Liberal Component</b>		
Underlying question: To what extent is the liberal principle of democracy achieved?  This index is formed by averaging the following indices: equality before the law and individual liberties (v2xcl_rol), judicial constraints on the executive (v2x_jucon), and legislative constraints on the executive (v2xlg_legcon).  Source: Coppedge et al. (2022)  Recode: In the analyses, we use a z-standardized version of the V-Dem score.	Mean	.02
	Standard deviation	1.00

**Appendix 3:** Attitudes towards military interventions when a country is ruled by a dictator

Note: N=32,964, post-stratification weights on the individual level as well as country weights adjusting the different sample sizes for the mean bar.

#### Appendix 4: Multilevel regression models with support for humanitarian military interventions regressed on individual-level variables

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Support for universal rights		0.034**	0.032**					0.033**	0.032**		0.033**
		(0.012)	(0.012)					(0.012)	(0.012)		(0.012)
Postmaterialism				-0.068	-0.075			-0.084		-0.075	-0.084
				(0.049)	(0.049)			(0.049)		(0.049)	(0.049)
Education: Middle						0.005	-0.013		-0.016	-0.012	-0.015
						(0.044)	(0.042)		(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Education: High						0.015	-0.016		-0.018	-0.014	-0.016
						(0.048)	(0.045)		(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Gender: Female			-0.001		0.001		0.002	-0.003	-0.002	0.001	-0.003
			(0.038)		(0.038)		(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Age: 35-54			-0.047		-0.052		-0.051	-0.049	-0.048	-0.053	-0.050
			(0.051)		(0.051)		(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Age: 55+			-0.281***		-0.288***		-0.287***	-0.283***	-0.283***	-0.289***	-0.285***
			(0.060)		(0.060)		(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.060)
Intercept	3.675***	3.520***	3.635***	3.684***	3.796***	3.668***	3.794***	3.645***	3.647***	3.806***	3.657***
	(0.072)	(0.097)	(0.094)	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.096)	(0.107)	(0.081)	(0.109)
Variance											
Country-level	0.126***	0.123***	0.124***	0.126***	0.128***	0.127***	0.128***	0.124***	0.124***	0.128***	0.124***
	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.049)
Individual-level	3.061***	3.058***	3.044***	3.061***	3.047***	3.061***	3.047***	3.043***	3.044***	3.047***	3.043***
	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.165)	(0.166)
N	32964	32964	32964	32964	32964	32964	32964	32964	32964	32964	32964
AIC	129900.13	129863.23	129724.62	129896.11	129752.93	129903.80	129761.83	129717.46	129728.07	129756.59	129720.99
BIC	129925.34	129896.85	129783.44	129929.72	129811.75	129945.82	129829.05	129784.68	129803.70	129832.22	129805.02
ICC	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Log Likelihood	-64947.07	-64927.62	-64855.31	-64944.05	-64869.46	-64946.90	-64872.91	-64850.73	-64855.04	-64869.30	-64850.50
Degrees of freedom	0.00	1.00	4.00	1.00	4.00	2.00	5.00	5.00	6.00	6.00	7.00

Standard errors in parentheses, significance: \*\*\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \* p<.001

**Appendix 5:** Multilevel regression models with support for humanitarian military interventions regressed on individual-level and country-level variables

	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13
Support for universal rights	0.033**	0.033**	0.033**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Postmaterialism	-0.084	-0.084	-0.084
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Education: Middle	-0.016	-0.017	-0.017
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Education: High	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
HDI	0.041		-0.015
	(0.062)		(0.078)
V-Dem		0.162	0.167
		(0.087)	(0.095)
Gender: Female	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Age: 35-54	-0.050	-0.050	-0.050
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Age: 55+	-0.285***	-0.286***	-0.286***
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.061)
Intercept	3.654***	3.655***	3.656***
	(0.107)	(0.105)	(0.106)
Variance			
Country-level	0.122***	0.097***	0.097***
	(0.049)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Individual-level	3.043***	3.043***	3.043***
	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.166)
N	32964	32964	32964
AIC	129722.68	129717.14	129719.09
BIC	129815.11	129809.58	129819.93
ICC	0.04	0.03	0.03
Log Likelihood	-64850.34	-64847.57	-64847.55
Degrees of freedom	8.00	8.00	9.00

Standard errors in parentheses, significance: \*\*\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \* p<.001

**Appendix 6:** Multilevel regression models with support for humanitarian economic sanctions regressed on individual-level and country-level variables

	Model 14	Model 15
Support for universal rights	0.051***	0.051***
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Postmaterialism	0.072	0.071
	(0.067)	(0.067)
Education: Middle	0.066*	0.063*
	(0.027)	(0.027)
Education: High	0.193***	0.190***
	(0.034)	(0.034)
HDI		0.243*
		(0.103)
V-Dem		0.123
		(0.080)
Gender: Female	-0.210***	-0.210***
	(0.027)	(0.027)
Age: 35-54	0.107*	0.106*
	(0.050)	(0.050)
Age: 55+	0.292***	0.289***
	(0.067)	(0.067)
Intercept	3.772***	3.750***
	(0.100)	(0.093)
Variance		
Country-level	0.219***	0.128***
	(0.058)	(0.032)
Individual-level	2.813***	2.813***
	(0.190)	(0.190)
N	32964	32964
AIC	127155.13	127146.14
BIC	127239.17	127246.97
ICC	0.07	0.04
Log Likelihood	-63567.57	-63561.07
Degrees of freedom	7.00	9.00

Standard errors in parentheses, significance: \*\*\* p<.05, \*\*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

**Appendix 7:** Multilevel regression models with support for attitudes toward human rights interventions adjusted for the effect of attitudes towards military intervention (neutralisation effect) regressed on individual-level and country-level variables

	<b>Model 18</b>	<b>Model 19</b>
<b>Support for universal rights</b>	0.018*	0.018*
	(0.007)	(0.007)
<b>Postmaterialism</b>	0.156**	0.156**
	(0.047)	(0.047)
<b>Education: Middle</b>	0.081*	0.080*
	(0.038)	(0.038)
<b>Education: High</b>	0.209***	0.206***
	(0.039)	(0.039)
<b>HDI</b>		0.259***
		(0.054)
<b>V-Dem</b>		-0.044
		(0.052)
<b>Gender: Female</b>	-0.207***	-0.207***
	(0.027)	(0.027)
<b>Age: 35-54</b>	0.158***	0.156***
	(0.038)	(0.038)
<b>Age: 55+</b>	0.578***	0.575***
	(0.082)	(0.082)
<b>Intercept</b>	0.112	0.094
	(0.068)	(0.074)
<b>Variance</b>		
<b>Country-level</b>	0.152***	0.094***
	(0.052)	(0.033)
<b>Individual-level</b>	3.026***	3.026***
	(0.266)	(0.266)
<b>N</b>	32964	32964
<b>AIC</b>	129541.28	129533.64
<b>BIC</b>	129625.31	129634.48
<b>ICC</b>	0.05	0.03
<b>Log Likelihood</b>	-64760.64	-64754.82
<b>Degrees of freedom</b>	7.00	9.00

Standard errors in parentheses, significance: \*\*\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \* p<.001



**Appendix 8:** Multilevel regression models with support for military interventions because of dictatorship regressed on individual-level and country-level variables

	Model 20	Model 21
Support for universal rights	0.031	0.031
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Postmaterialism	-0.052	-0.052
	(0.049)	(0.049)
Education: Middle	0.031	0.030
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Education: High	0.007	0.007
	(0.052)	(0.051)
HDI		-0.129*
		(0.064)
V-Dem		0.192*
		(0.086)
Gender: Female	-0.043	-0.043
	(0.042)	(0.042)
Age: 35-54	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.040)	(0.040)
Age: 55+	-0.159**	-0.158**
	(0.056)	(0.056)
Intercept	3.566***	3.573***
	(0.127)	(0.125)
Variance		
Country-level	0.139***	0.101***
	(0.051)	(0.027)
Individual-level	3.171***	3.171***
	(0.155)	(0.155)
N	32094	32094
AIC	127413.06	127409.50
BIC	127496.83	127510.02
ICC	0.04	0.03
Log Likelihood	-63696.53	-63692.75
Degrees of freedom	7.00	9.00

Standard errors in parentheses, significance: \*\*\* p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \* p<.001

**Appendix 9:** OLS regression model with support for humanitarian military interventions regressed on individual-level variables, including country fixed-effects

	<b>Model 22</b>
<b>Support for universal rights</b>	0.033**
	(0.012)
<b>Postmaterialism</b>	-0.084
	(0.049)
<b>Education: Middle</b>	-0.015
	(0.042)
<b>Education: High</b>	-0.015
	(0.044)
<b>Gender: Female</b>	-0.003
	(0.038)
<b>Age: 35-54</b>	-0.050
	(0.052)
<b>Age: 55+</b>	-0.285***
	(0.061)
<b>Country (ref: Australia)</b>	
<b>Brazil</b>	-0.367***
	(0.015)
<b>Chile</b>	-0.541***
	(0.009)
<b>France</b>	0.179***
	(0.006)
<b>Germany</b>	-0.728***
	(0.007)
<b>Ghana</b>	-0.821***
	(0.029)
<b>India</b>	0.170***
	(0.035)
<b>Indonesia</b>	-0.393***
	(0.022)
<b>Italy</b>	-0.575***
	(0.009)
<b>Japan</b>	-0.593***
	(0.009)
<b>Latvia</b>	-0.102***

	<b>Model 22</b>
	(0.012)
<b>Mexico</b>	-0.355***
	(0.022)
<b>Nigeria</b>	-0.090**
	(0.031)
<b>Poland</b>	-0.353***
	(0.008)
<b>Russia</b>	-1.475***
	(0.016)
<b>Senegal</b>	-0.313***
	(0.043)
<b>Singapore</b>	-0.343***
	(0.007)
<b>Spain</b>	0.243***
	(0.008)
<b>South Africa</b>	-0.126***
	(0.022)
<b>South Korea</b>	-0.360***
	(0.005)
<b>Sweden</b>	-0.080***
	(0.006)
<b>Turkey</b>	-0.501***
	(0.022)
<b>United Kingdom</b>	-0.029***
	(0.006)
<b>USA</b>	-0.022***
	(0.005)
<b>Intercept</b>	3.978***
	(0.093)
<b>N</b>	32964
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.0497

Standard errors in parentheses, significance: \*\*\* p<.05, \*\*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

**Appendix 10:** Multilevel regression models with support for humanitarian military interventions regressed on individual-level and country-level variables - comparing maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) (without weights) and restricted maximum likelihood estimation (REML)

	Model 23	Model 24
Support for universal rights	0.030***	0.030***
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Postmaterialism	-0.068*	-0.068*
	(0.028)	(0.028)
Education: Middle	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Education: High	-0.012	-0.012
	(0.026)	(0.026)
HDI	-0.030	-0.030
	(0.067)	(0.072)
V-Dem	0.196**	0.196**
	(0.066)	(0.071)
Gender: Female	-0.010	-0.010
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Age: 35-54	-0.061**	-0.061**
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Age: 55+	-0.313***	-0.313***
	(0.026)	(0.026)
Intercept	3.668***	3.668***
	(0.072)	(0.076)
Variance		
Country-level	0.092***	0.106***
	(0.027)	(0.033)
Individual-level	3.010***	3.010***
	(0.023)	(0.023)
N	32964	32964
AIC	129983.67	130037.32
BIC	130084.51	130138.16
ICC	0.03	0.03
Log Likelihood	-64979.84	-65006.66
Degrees of freedom	9.00	9.00

Standard errors in parentheses, significance: \*\*\* p<.05, \*\*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

## SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER SERIES

**No. 1 2020** Tanja A. Börzel and Michael Zürn  
Contestations of the Liberal Script. A Research Program

**No. 2 2020** Hans-Jürgen Puhle  
Populism and Democracy in the 21st Century

**No. 3 2020** Tanja A. Börzel and Michael Zürn  
Contestations of the Liberal International Order.  
From Liberal Multilateralism to Postnational Liberalism

**No. 4 2020** Daniel Drewski and Jürgen Gerhards  
The Liberal Border Script and Its Contestations.  
An Attempt of Definition and Systematization

**No. 5 2020** Tanja A. Börzel  
Contesting the EU Refugee Regime

**No. 6 2021** Claudia Rauhut  
Slavery, Liberal Thought, and Reparations. Contesting the  
Compensation of Slave Owners in the Caribbean

**No. 7 2021** Camilla Reuterswärd  
Organized Religion and Contestations of the Liberal  
Script. The Catholic Church, Body Politics, and Anti-Gender  
Mobilizations

**No. 8 2021** Tully Rector  
Corporate Power. A Problem for Liberal Legitimacy

**No. 9 2022** Ankur Yadav  
A Contestation of the Western Liberal Script in India. The  
Rise of Cultural Nationalism

**No. 10 2021** Michael Zürn and Johannes Gerschewski  
Sketching the Liberal Script. A Target of Contestations

**No. 11 2021** Jared Holley  
Recovering the Anticolonial Roots of Solidarity

**No. 12 2021** Bastian A. Betthäuser,  
Nhat An Trinh, and Anette Eva Fasang  
The Temporal Dimension of Parental Employment. Fixed-  
Term Contracts, Non-Standard Work Schedules, and  
Children's Education in Germany

**No. 13 2021** Kevin Axe, Tobias Rupprecht, and  
Alice Trinkle  
Peripheral Liberalism. New Perspectives on the History of  
the Liberal Script in the (Post-)Socialist World

**No. 14 2021** Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Carsten  
Wegscheider, and Steven M. Van Hauwaert  
Supporting and Rejecting Populist Parties in Western  
Europe

**No. 15 2022** Rona Geffen  
The Timing of Lives: The Role of Standard Employment in  
Income Mobility and Co-residential Unions  
in Early Adulthood

**No. 16 2022** Jan-Werner Müller  
Liberal Democracy's Critical Infrastructure. How to Think  
about Intermediary Powers

**No. 17 2022** Johannes Petry  
Global Financial Reallocation towards China: Implications  
for the Liberal Financial Script

**No. 18 2022** Jan-Werner Müller  
Still the "Fourth Power"? Rethinking the Press in Liberal  
Democracies

**No. 19 2022** Albert Cullell Cano  
The Chinese Peacebuilding Script: A Pragmatic Contestation  
of the Liberal International Order

**No. 20 2022** Silviya Lechner  
The Responsibility of Global Governance Institutions:  
Towards a Kantian Conception of the Current Liberal Order

**No. 21 2022** Sébastien Tremblay  
Homosynchronism and the Temporal-Memory Border:  
Framing Racialized Bodies, Time, and Mobility in German  
Queer Printed Media

**No. 22 2022** Jürgen Gerhards, Lukas Antoine, and  
Rasmus Ollroge  
The Liberal Script on Military Humanitarian Intervention  
and How Citizens around the World Support It. Results  
from a Comparative Survey in 24 Countries



All SCRIPTS Working Papers are available on the SCRIPTS website at [www.scripts-berlin.eu](http://www.scripts-berlin.eu)  
and can be ordered in print via email to [office@scripts-berlin.eu](mailto:office@scripts-berlin.eu)



Hosted by:



**Berlin University  
Alliance**

In Cooperation with:



**WZB**

Berlin Social Science Center



**Hertie School**



**zois**

Zentrum für Osteuropa-  
und internationale Studien  
Centre for East European  
and International Studies



German Institute of Global and Area Studies  
Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien



The Cluster of Excellence  
“Contestations of the Liberal Script (SCRIPTS)”  
is funded by:



Deutsche  
Forschungsgemeinschaft  
German Research Foundation